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A LEGAL AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
PLAYER DRAFT: CHICAGO, NEW YORK,
DETROIT, IT'S ALL THE SAME PICK'
By
Ethan Lock*
and
J. Michael Gratz**
I. INTRODUCTION
The focus of controversy in much of the antitrust litigation in the
sports industry has been on the various restraints that limit the move-
ment of players among teams.2 The amateur player draft is one of
these restraints. This article analyzes the National Football League
(NFL) player draft, both in terms of the relevant antitrust and labor
law issues and in terms of the actual impact of the draft on team
performances.
A brief discussion of the draft and its legality under the antitrust
laws is presented in section II. The legality of the draft depends on
many factors, one of which is whether the justifications for the draft
outweigh its anticompetitive effects.3 Thus, particular attention is given
to the League's justifications for the draft.
Collective bargaining has become a dominant force in the NFL.
Player restraints such as the draft are now contained in collective bar-
gaining agreements between the National Football League Players' As-
sociation (NFLPA) and the National Football League Management
1. A second study, containing a legal and statistical analysis of the National Football
League Scheduling Format, will appear in the next edition of the Entertainment Law
Journal.
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Arizona State University.
** Doctoral Candidate, Quantitative Systems Department, Arizona State University.
2. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), modfy-
ing 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975) (Rozelle Rule); Bryant v. National Football League,
No. CV 75-2543 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 1975) (Rozelle Rule); Kapp v. National Football
League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (Rozelle Rule, tampering rule); Smith v. Pro-
Football Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976) (Player Draft).
3. See infra note 19.
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Council (NFL).4 Section III explains the purposes and scope of the
labor exemption and section IV addresses the issue of whether this ex-
emption can be used to shield the draft from antitrust attack simply
because provisions for the draft are contained in a collective bargaining
agreement. The discussion in section IV suggests that there may be
some situations in which the labor exemption will not be available to
immunize the draft from the antitrust laws.
A statistical study that was conducted to test the validity of the
owners' justifications for the draft is presented in section V. The results
of this study are relevant to any future antitrust litigation involving the
NFL player draft.
II. ANTITRUST ISSUES
4. Application of the Antitrust Laws to the NFL Player Draft
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 condemns "every"
contract or combination in restraint of trade among the states.' Al-
though this language is broad enough to condemn virtually every type
of business arrangement,6 the Supreme Court has ruled that the Act
prohibits only unreasonable restraints of trade.7 This interpretation al-
lows courts to consider, in some situations,8 justifications for a particu-
lar restraint.
The teams in the NFL are bound by a set of agreements that re-
strict the competition and divide the market for playing talent.9 Courts
have recognized that these restraints may violate section 1 of the Sher-
4. See National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement (1977).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
6. Burkow and Slaughter, Should Amateur Athletes Resist The Draft?, 7 BLACK L.J.
314, 325 (1981).
7. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
8. The Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 1 has led to the evolution of two
standards under which courts scrutinize retraints of trade; the per se standard and the rule of
reason standard. The per se standard is extremely rigid. Under this standard, certain types
of restraints are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and, thus, unlawful. Northern
Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Application of the per se standard
precludes any inquiry into the reasonableness of the restraint. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The rule
of reason, on the other hand, is more flexible. Under this standard, a restraint is lawful if it
is reasonable and unlawful if it is unreasonable. The determination of reasonableness is
based upon a thorough examination of the nature of the business or industry and the pur-
pose and effect of the restraint being scrutinized. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Weistart and Lowell, The Law ofProfessional Sports
592-93 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Weistart].
9. The National Football League Player Draft is an example of such an agreement.
See National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement Article XIII, § 4 (1977).
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man Act.' 0 However, in each of the cases involving antitrust attacks on
player restraints, the NFL has argued that the peculiar needs of profes-
sional football require that individual teams be allowed to engage in
certain types of collective behavior that violate the antitrust laws. I"
This argument is based on the fact that there is a direct correlation
between fan interest (or gate receipts and television revenues) and the
unpredictability of the outcome of individual games and divisional
races. 2 Therefore, the League contends, mechanisms or restraints that
prevent individual teams from becoming too strong or competing too
well, in an effort to accumulate the best talent, are essential to the sur-
vival of the League. "
B. Structural Analysis of the NFL Draft System
The NFL conducts a draft whereby teams select new players who
have not previously signed professional contracts." The draft is one
mechanism that the League argues helps achieve the equalization of
team strengths. 5
Perhaps the most prominent feature of the draft system is that it is
ostensibly designed to enable the weaker teams to improve themselves
each year in relation to the better teams. The present draft consists of
twelve rounds, and teams exercise draft rights in reverse order of their
playing records so that the team with the worst record receives the first
selection in each round. In theory, this gives the weaker teams a rela-
10. See, Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (challenge to
NFL's rule requiring free agent's new team to compensate former team), cert. dismissed, 434
U.S. 801 (1977); Smith v. National Football League, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (challenge to, inter
alia, NFL's compensation rule, player selection draft, and no-tampering rule), a]J'd in part,
appeal dismissed as moot in part, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907
(1979).
11. Weistart, supra note 8, at 595; See, Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d
606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). In Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.C. 1976), the NFL made a similar argument in support of the player
draft, claiming that the draft "has the legitimate business purpose of promoting 'competitive
balance' and playing-field equality among the teams, producing better entertainment for the
public, higher salaries for the players, and increased financial security for the clubs." Id at
1186. Citedfrom Sobel, Application of the Labor Exemption After the Expiration of Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164 n.9 (1982).
12. Demmert, The Economics of Professional Team Sports 10-11 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Demmert].
13. Id at pp. 31-33; Weistart, supra note 8, at 597.
14. National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement Article XIII, § 4 (1977).
15. Sobel, Professional Sports and the Law, 251 (1977); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593
F.2d at 1186.
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tively greater opportunity for improvement.'
6
This apparent opportunity for improvement is protected by an-
other feature of the draft system. Each team acquires the exclusive
right to negotiate with each player it selects in the draft. 7 This right is
reinforced by an agreement among the teams to respect the exclusive
rights of every other team.' 8 Thus, during the period in which teams
are granted the exclusive bargaining rights to their draftees, the teams
essentially agree not to compete with each other for new players and
each player is forced to bargain with one team.
Courts, in considering the reasonableness of particular player re-
straints, have been concerned with whether the justifications for the re-
straint outweigh its anticompetitive effects.' 9 Critics of the draft argue
that the present system affects the distribution of income between the
player and team.20 As each team agrees to respect the exclusive draft
rights of every other team, each player is forced to negotiate with only
the team that drafts him. The player is essentially prevented from test-
ing the market for his skills.2 ' He loses the bargaining advantage that
would be gained by using competing offers from other teams to bid up
his price. 22 The team, then, can usually be expected to have the upper
hand in player-team negotiations. As a result, the player receives a
salary that does not approximate his fair market value.23
This effect on salaries has been most apparent during periods of
inter-league competition for players. A new league emerges, competi-
tion for new players develops between one team in each league, and
players' salaries rise substantially.24
16. Canes, The Social Benefits of Restrictions on Team Quality in Government and the
Sports Business 86 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
17. National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement Article XIII, § 4 (1977).
18. Id
19. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (NFL
player draft without procompetitive virtues in an economic sense to offset its anticompetitive
purpose and effect); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976)
(Rozelle Rule more restrictive than necessary to serve its legitimate objectives), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D.
Cal. 1974) (perpetual reserve system not justified by any need to protect NFL employers or
NFL purposes), afd in part, dismissed as moot in part, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). Citedfrom 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164 n.10 (1982).
20. Demmert, supra note 12, at 38.
21. Weistart, supra note 8, at 506.
22. Id at 504; Demmert, supra note 12, at 38.
23. Robertson v. National Basketball Association, 389 F. Supp. 867, 893 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
24. Noll, The U.S. Team Sports Industry: An Introduction in Government and the Sports
Business 5 (R. Noll ed. 1974); Demmert, supra note 12, at 22.
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This system also has long-range salary implications. Although the
draft has a direct impact on the salary only once, it can, and in most
cases does, help define the parameters of the athlete's career earning
potential. The salary that the athlete receives in the final year of his
first contract (or first set of contracts) is the base from which he negoti-
ates his next contract. In practical terms, this base places limits on the
salaries he will receive in his second set of contracts.
There is little evidence suggesting that the League denies that the
draft system reduces player salaries. Rather, the League has responded
that this reduction is an unavoidable consequence of its effort to main-
tain competitive balance among its teams.25 Granting weaker teams
selection priorities in the draft presumably reduces the disparity in
quality between the best and worst teams in the League.
It might be that the League, in order to survive, must adopt some
institutional mechanisms to ensure competitive balance. Whether the
League's justifications for the draft outweigh its anticompetitive effects
depends in part on how close the draft comes to actually realizing this
goal. The NFL draft was tested in Smith v. Pro Football Inc.2 6 and the
court's analysis in that case suggests that the factual information neces-
sary to evaluate the draft had not been gathered. Addressing the claim
that the NFL draft preserved competitive balance, the court noted that
in the three prior seasons 22 of 24 of the play-off slots had been earned
by only nine teams.27 This fact merely indicated that certain teams
were able to maintain their competitive superiority over the three-year
period despite the draft.
Although more sophisticated evidence was not used to test the
League's justification for the draft, the court in Smith concluded that
the draft was an illegal restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.28 If the draft is challenged again in court, 29 the owners will
presumably argue that, despite the ruling in Smith, the labor exemption
immunizes the draft from antitrust attack.3" The purposes and scope of
25. Weistart, supra note 8, at 504-05.
26. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
27. Id at 746, cited from Weistart, supra note 8, at 615 n.760.
28. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 744-45 (D.D.C. 1976).
29. In 1977, shortly after the decision in Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., the National Foot-
ball League Players' Association and the National Football League Management Council
signed a five year collective bargaining agreement. See Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the National Football League Players' Association and the National Football
League (March 2, 1977). This agreement provided that the annual amateur player draft,
although modified from seventeen rounds to twelve rounds, would still be held.
30. This presumption is based on the fact that the League has previously raised this
argument in antitrust cases attacking restraints contained in collective bargaining agree-
1982]
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this exemption are discussed in the following section.
III. LABOR EXEMPTION
A. Statutory Exemption
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 18901 was enacted to regulate the
commercial activities of business.3 2 As the original version of the Act
contained no language exempting the activities of labor unions,33 labor
groups were thereafter prosecuted as "illegal combinations in restraint
of trade" under section 1 of the Act.34 The purpose of the Act, however,
was not to restrict labor union activity.35 Thus, Congress enacted addi-
tional legislation to provide an exemption for labor movement
activities.36
Section 6 of the Clayton Act, adopted in 1914 states that unions
are not "illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade."37
Section 20 of the Act limits the power of courts to interfere with certain
enumerated types of union organizational activities.38
The Supreme Court subsequently interpreted these provisions very
narrowly and, as a result, left many union activities, such as group boy-
cotts and secondary picketing, vulnerable to antitrust attack.39 The
ments. See, e.g., Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975); Smith v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
32. The Supreme Court has indicated that the dominant purpose of the Sherman Act
was the regulation of the commercial activities of business. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Electri-
cal Workers Local 3, 325 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1945); cf Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469, 489-501 (1940). The legislative history tends to support this conclusion. 51 Cong. Rec.
13663 (1914) (Remarks of Senator Ashurst). Citedfrom Weistart, supra note 8, at 528 n.313.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
34. See Select Comm. on Professional Sports, Inquiry into Professional Sports, H.R.
Rep. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Report].
35. Id
36. For a general discussion of the legislative history of these Congressional actions see
T. Kheel, Labor Law (18 Business Organizations 1971) §§ 4.03-.04. Cited from Weistart,
supra note 8, at 527 n.317.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
39. In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), the Court read the
Clayton Act as exempting only those union activities which were directed against the em-
ployees' immediate employers. Union efforts to boycott the employer's products in the
hands of other dealers and other secondary activities were said to be still subject to the
Sherman Act proscription on trade restraints. Thus, the statutes were applied in a manner
significantly limited the types of economic power which a union could exercise in its efforts
to promote employee interests. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 3, 325
U.S. 797, 805-06 (1945). Citedfrom Weistart, supra note 8, at 529 n.320.
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Norris-LaGuardia Act, passed in 1932, expanded the classification of
protected-union activities.4 0
The labor exemptions in these two acts were enacted to insulate
legitimate labor union activity from the reach of the antitrust laws4'
and they continue to be the primary statutory sources of the labor ex-
emption.4 2 Yet, the Supreme Court held that these statutory labor ex-
emptions only protect union conduct in furtherance of the union's own
interests either undertaken alone or with other labor groups.43 The two
acts do not protect conduct undertaken by a union in concert with a
nonlabor group.'
Collective bargaining agreements, or agreements between union
and nonunion groups, by definition, do not fall within the scope of the
statutory exemption. Thus, although the Norris-LaGuardia Act ac-
knowledges the importance of fostering "concerted activity for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining,"45 neither statute provides standards to
test the substance of labor-management agreements under the antitrust
laws.6
The labor exemption is not simply a tool to protect union activ-
ity. 7 It is also a means of accommodating congressional policy favor-
ing collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act.4
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has found that the two statutes imply
a separate, nonstatutory labor exemption.49 The task of defining the
scope of this nonstatutory exemption and providing standards to test
labor management agreements has been assumed by the courts.50
40. 47 Stat. 70 (1931), as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976).
41. Strauss, Sport In Court.- The Legality of Professional Football's System of Reserve and
Compensation, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 252, 270 (1980).
42. Weistart, supra note 8, at 529.
43. Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
44. Id; Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
46. Weistart, supra note 8, at 529.
47. Id at 526-27.
48. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (West 1973, 1978, Supp. 1981 & 1980 Laws Special Pam-
phlet). Section 1 of that Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), provides in pertinent part: It is de-
clared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. Citedfrom 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 174-84 n.24 (1982).
49. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965).
50. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
622 (1975). Cited in Weistart, supra note 8, at 529 n.325.
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B. Nonstatutory Exemption
One of the purposes of the nonstatutory labor exemption is to har-
monize the policies of the Sherman Act with the policies of the federal
labor statutes fostering collective bargaining between unions and em-
ployers.5 ' Application of the antitrust laws to terms included in collec-
tive bargaining agreements would threaten the finality of bargained-for
provisions and thus disrupt the collective bargaining process.12 If bar-
gained-for provisions could subsequently be invalidated on antitrust
grounds, the bargaining parties would be less willing to make conces-
sions.5 3 For example, management would be less willing to increase
medical or pension benefits in exchange for the continuation of a par-
ticular restraint (such as the draft) if there was a possibility that the
union could later secure judicial review of that restraint. Collective
bargaining agreements would certainly be more difficult to achieve if
concessions won at the bargaining table could subsequently be lost in
court. 4 In fact, judicial review of the terms of collective bargaining
agreements undermines the national labor policy favoring collective
bargaining. 5 As a result, the nonstatutory judicially created exemption
is often applied by the courts to protect the terms of collective bargain-
ing agreements from antitrust attack. 6
C. Scope of the Nonstatutory Exemption
The federal labor law policy favoring the collective bargaining
process has prompted some legal scholars to suggest that those matters
that are the subject of collective bargaining agreements should never be
6pen to antitrust challenges by disappointed members of the bargain-
ing units. 7 Such challenges, it is argued, whether or not successful,
51. 1977 House Report, supra note 34, at 26. Cited in Strauss, Sport in Court: The Legal-
ity of Professional Football's System of Reserve and Compensation, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 252,
268 (1980).
52. Weistart, supra note 8, 559, 561.
53. Id at 560.
54. See generally Wellington, Labor and the Legal Process 26-30, 49-63 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Wellington]; Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by
Athletes Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 7-9 (1971). Citedfrom Weistart, supra
note 8, at 561 n.485.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See supra note 48 for relevant portion of statute.
56. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611-12 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
57. Jacobs and Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes. Of
Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971). For an expansion upon Jacobs' and Winter's
thesis see Lowell, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Team Sports Industry, 38 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1973). Citedfrom 7 BLACK L.J. 314, 330 (1981).
[Vol. 2
NFL PLA YER DRAFT ANALYSIS
would effectively destroy the collective bargaining process by under-
mining the authority of the bargaining representative.1
8
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a proper accommoda-
tion between policies favoring collective bargaining and policies favor-
ing free competition in business markets requires that some union-
management agreements be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption
from the antitrust laws.5' Thus, if the union interest involved is imme-
diate and direct and relates to wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment, and there is no evidence of a conspiracy,6 ° the provision
may be exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
The nonstatutory labor cases have not, however, held that collec-
tive bargaining agreements are automatically immune from antitrust
review. The cases suggest, for example, that the exemption is not avail-
able where unions and employers conspire together to injure the em-
ployers' competitors.6' In fact, it is not clear that employers may
bargain collectively with immunity even in situations where the targets
of their conspiracy are their current or potential employees rather than
their competitors.62
In United Mine Workers v. Pennington 63 where the union, in re-
turn for higher wages and fringe benefits, agreed to impose uniform
industry wage scales on operators outside the bargaining unit, the
Court said: "A collective bargaining agreement resulting from union-
employer negotiations is not automatically exempt from Sherman Act
scrutiny simply because the negotiations involve a compulsory subject
of bargaining, regardless of the subject or the form and content of the
agreement."'  The court went on to state that there are limits to what
the parties may offer or extract in the name of wages.65 Simply because
they must bargain does not mean that the agreement may disregard
other laws.66
The Supreme Court decisions that address the issue of the nonstat-
utory labor exemptions indicate two things. First, the precise limits of
58. 81 YALE L.J. 1, 27 (1971). Citedfrom 7 BLACK L.J. 314, 330 (1981).
59. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
60. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (plu-
rality opinion).
61. Allen Bradley v. Local Union 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); Local 189, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965).
62. 7 BLACK L.J. 314, 331 (1981).
63. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
64. Id at 664.
65. Id at 665.
66. Id
19821
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the exemption are unclear. Second, the scope of the exemption must be
determined in light of the competing labor and antitrust policies.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
A. Nonstatutory Exemption
In the context of professional sports, the leagues have often argued
that the player restraints should be protected from antitrust attack be-
cause they are incorporated into collective bargaining agreements.67
Although the exemption has actually been applied only once,68 most
courts have recognized that the labor exemption could be available
under certain circumstances to immunize player restraints from the an-
titrust laws.69 The issue, then, is to what extent the labor exemption
applies.
The collective bargaining agreements in professional sports fail by
definition to qualify for the statutory exemption. In order to survive
antitrust attack, then, they must fall within the nonstatutory exemption.
Before applying the nonstatutory exemption to immunize a particular
collective bargaining agreement, a court must conclude that the federal
labor law policy fostering collective bargaining deserves preeminence
over the federal antitrust policies favoring free competition.7 ° Several
factors relevant to the balance between competing labor and antitrust
concerns have emerged from the sports cases.
71
The Eighth Circuit in Mackey v. National Football League7" con-
67. For a summary of the recent history of collective bargaining in professional sports,
see Weistart supra note 8 at 777, § 6.01.
68. McCourt v. Calif. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d at 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
69. See, e.g., Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 288 (8th Cir. 1978)
(dictum); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) (exemption
available but not applied under the circumstances), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc., v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462,
518 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (exemption available but not applied under the circumstances). Cited
from 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 169 n.13 (1982).
70. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); see Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
622 (1975); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-69 (1965); Local 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965). Cited/rom 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164,
179 n.51 (1982).
71. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 613-15 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc., v. Philadelphia Na-
tional Football League 351 F. Supp. 462, 496-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Boston Professional
Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 267-68 (D. Mass.), remanded on other grounds,
472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972). Citedfrom 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 180 n.53 (1982).
72. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
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solidated these factors into a concise three-pronged test that accurately
reflected the major concerns of the prior nonsport cases involving the
nonstatutory labor exemption 73 and the prior sports cases that consid-
ered the labor exemption in the context of challenges to player re-
straints.74 This test was later adopted by the district and circuit courts
in McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.75 The Eighth Circuit's discussion
of the nonstatutory exemption provides insight into the standards an
agreement must meet to qualify for the exemption. In the absence of
new case law, it is appropriate to examine current restraints against this
three-pronged standard.76
The circuit court in Mackey v. National Football League 7" sug-
gested that provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement
might be immunized from antitrust attack where the challenged prac-
tice is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the agreement is
the product of bona fide arm's-length negotiations, and the restraints
primarily affect only the parties to the collective bargaining agree-
ment.78 The question of whether the current NFL draft system meets
the standards of this test and thus qualifies for the exemption has not
been satisfactorily resolved.
Three related issues are discussed below. The first issue addressed
is whether the nonstatutory labor exemption absolutely shields the
draft from antitrust attack by potential draftees. This discussion fo-
cuses on the requirements of the Mackey test. The next issue consid-
ered is whether the union, by agreeing to the draft, breaches its duty of
fair representation to potential draftees. A breach of this duty would
enable amateur athletes to challenge the player draft on antitrust
grounds, despite the labor exemption. The final issue discussed is the
availability of the nonstatutory labor exemption upon expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement.
73. Id at 609 n.I. Ciedfrom 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 180 n.61 (1982).
74. Weistart, supra note 8, at 575-82 (analyzing the Mackey test). Citedfrom 57 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 164, 180 n.56 (1982).
75. 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'g 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
76. 7 BLACK L.J. 314, 334 (1981).
77. 543 F.2d at 606, 614.
78. Id at 614.
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B. Application of the Mackey Test to Amateur Athletes and the
Player Draft
1. Mandatory Subject of Bargaining Requirement
The National Labor Relations Act7 9 requires that employers and
unions bargain over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment.8" The Mackey requirement that the challenged practice
be a mandatory subject of collective bargaining 8' guarantees that the
practice is important enough to justify overriding the policies of the
antitrust laws. 2
A difficult question to answer is whether the amateur player draft
is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Addressing this ques-
tion it must be noted that every practice or provision that vitally affects
the terms and conditions of present workers' employment is not neces-
sarily a mandatory subject of bargaining."' More importantly, the
player draft has a significant impact on the wages and terms and condi-
tions of employment of the drafted athlete. In other words, the draft
rules apply primarily to parties outside the collective bargaining unit 4
and do not vitally affect the terms and conditions of players in the
league. 5 The real issue, then, is whether it is mandatory for the parties
to negotiate an agreement which includes a system primarily limiting
where and how potential and future athletes can work.86
2. Bona Fide Arm's-Length Agreement Requirement
The requirement that the agreement is the product of bona fide
arm's-length negotiations has surfaced as the most difficult issue in the
sports cases. 87 To foster the collective bargaining process, courts have
79. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (West 1973, 1978, Supp. 1981 & 1980 Laws Special
Pamphlet).
80. Id. § 158(d).
81. 543 F.2d at 614 (citing UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Local 189, Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965)).
82. 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 182 (1982).
83. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
84. 543 F.2d at 614; Chemical Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157 (1971); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Local 24,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
85. Terry, Application of Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports' Eligibility and Draft Rules
46 Mo. L. REV. 797, 812-13 (1981).
86. 7 BLACK L.J. 314, 334 (1981).
87. See, e.g., McCourt v. Calif. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey
v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615-16 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173, Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
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expressed a willingness to apply the labor exemption as long as union
acceptance of anticompetitive restraints is evidenced by an agreement
reached through serious, good-faith negotiations. 88 Yet, mere incorpo-
ration of restraints in a collective bargaining agreement will not immu-
nize the restraints from antitrust challenges unless those restraints are
the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.8 9 Courts have dis-
cussed several factors in defining the contours of bona fide arm's-length
bargaining, one of which is the relative strength and experience of the
union and the league.90 Courts have carefully considered the bargain-
ing history between the parties and, where the restraint was "thrust
upon a weak players' union by the owners,"'" have been unwilling to
assume that its inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement necessar-
ily evidenced the existence of a bona fide arm's-length agreement. 92
Indeed, the Mackey court, showing concern over agreements unilater-
ally imposed due to the weak bargaining position of the union,93 recog-
nized that genuine bargaining cannot take place when one party is in a
position of superior strength.94 If courts are skeptical about agreements
unilaterally imposed on an existing party to a collective bargaining
agreement, it seems likely that this skepticism would extend to agree-
ments unilaterally imposed on potential employees who were not par-
ties to the agreement. In this context, any agreement reached would
truly be thrust upon potential employees.
3. Impact Primarily on Parties to Agreement Requirement
The requirement that the restraints primarily95 affect only parties
Club, Inc., .351 F. Supp. 462, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v.
Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 267-68 (D. Mass.), remanded on other grounds, 472 F.2d 127 (1st
Cir. 1972). Even in Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), in which the court rejected a proposed test for application of the labor exemption
essentially comprised of only the first two prongs of the Mackey test, id at 886-89, the court
stressed the critical nature of the inquiry as "whether the challenged restraints were ever the
Isubject of serious, intensive, arm's-length collective bargaining,' "id at 895 (citing Philadel-
phia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. at 499). Cited
from 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 183 n.75 (1982).
88. See cases cited in note 87.
89. Weistart, supra note 8, at 586. See also N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 184 n.79 (1982).
90. 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 184-85 (1982).
91. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D.D.C. 1976),affldinpart, rev'din
part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
92. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d at 616.
93. 543 F.2d at 616.
94. Id at 617. Cited in Sport in Court: The Legality of Professional Football's System of
Rescue and Compensation, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 252, 286.
95. The word "primarily" reflects the recognition that some incidental effects on outsid-
ers are inevitable when competition between members of a multiemployer bargaining unit-
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to the collective bargaining agreement reflects a position taken by the
Supreme Court in the nonsport cases. 96 Where the effects of an agree-
ment are primarily internal, the relevant legal framework is provided
by the labor laws.97 The antitrust statutes will come into play, how-
ever, when the parties attempt to extend the influence of their collective
bargaining agreement beyond the immediate concerns of their employ-
ment relationship98 to parties who are not part of the bargaining pro-
cess. 9 9  Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between collective
bargaining provisions that impose restraints on existing players and
those, such as the draft, that affect new entrants.
It would be difficult to argue that the draft primarily affects only
parties to the agreement. Essentially, it limits the employment oppor-
tunities of draftees. Thus, the draft clearly affects individuals who are
not part of the bargaining unit and who had no control over the sub-
stance of the ultimate agreement.
The question of whether the labor exemption should immunize the
draft from antitrust attack by potential union members or those outside
the bargaining unit depends at least in part on the manner in which the
range of interests of the bargaining unit employees is defined."° Ex-
isting nonsport precedents suggest that a union may properly seek to
control outsiders' access to employment opportunity within the rele-
vant bargaining unit."°' More specifically, courts have held that unions
have the right to press demands concerning the operation of hiring
halls to allocate employees among various employers.' 02 The relevant
cases acknowledge the direct and unavoidable relationship between
new and existing employees. 0 3 New entrants compete for jobs with
competition based on differences in the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment each individual employer provides to its employees-is eliminated through collective
bargaining. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975);
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664 (1965). Citedfrom 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 181 n.64
(1982).
96. The Mackey court cited Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); and Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters, v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). See 543 F.2d at 614.
97. Weistart, supra note 8, at 549.
98. 1d.
99. Id at 548.
100. Id. at 554.
101. Id.
102. See Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). Morris, Developing Labor
Law, 712-715 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
103. See, e.g., NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. 143
NLRB 409, enforced, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966). Cited
from Weistart, supra note 8, at 554 n.450.
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existing employees and thus undermine existing employee job security.
It is recognized, therefore, that the union may extend its sphere of influ-
ence to affect new employees who have not yet had opportunities to
participate in union decision-making."
The argument has been made that a concern over imbalances in
team strengths and the resulting impact on fan interest has prompted
player unions to accept restraints on the mobility of existing players. i0 5
Although this same consideration might also cause the union to seek
restraints on the ability of new entrants to choose their own employ-
ers, 1o6 it is not clear for several reasons that this argument can be ap-
plied to immunize the draft.
First, this justification is valid only if the draft does, in fact, help
equalize team strengths. More importantly, the significance of the
precedents in the hiring hall cases to the sports industry, is questiona-
ble. Hiring hall procedures are not absolutely analogous to the ama-
teur player draft. The union members in a hiring hall often possess
roughly equal skills to perform similar functions, and therefore often
receive equal pay.' 7 The union members in the NFLPA neither pos-
sess equal skills nor receive equal pay.0 8 Finally, restrictions on the
movement of players (and hiring halls) have an impact on existing as
well as new or potential employees. Restraints of this nature, that di-
rectly affect those in the relevant bargaining unit, would seem to be less
objectionable than restraints such as the draft that primarily affect po-
tential employees outside the bargaining unit.
C. Duty of Fair Representation Owed to Amateur Athletes
Even if the requirements of the Mackey test were satisfied, the
draft could still be attacked by draftees if the player union failed to
fulfill its duty of fair representation. 109 The union's duty to represent
each employee fairly originates from its status as the exclusive bargain-
ing agent for its members.110 A union breaches its duty when its con-
104. See generally Morris 726-56 (1971). Citedfrom Weistart, supra note 8, at 554.
105. See, e.g., Comment, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports
and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HAR. L. REV. 418, 420-23 (1967); Comment, Player Control Mech-
anisms in Professional Sports, 34 U. PrrT. L. REV. 645, 651-52 (1973). Citedfrom Weistart,
supra note 8, at 554.
106. Weistart, supra note 8 at 554.
107. 7 BLACK L.J. 314, 338 (1981).
108. Upon expiration of the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement in 1982, the NFLPA
did bargain for a wage scale under which all players would receive a base salary based on
their years in the League. No wage scale was previously employed by the League.
109. 7 BLACK L.J. 314, 334-335 (1981).
110. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 1982 (1944).
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duct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith. The union also has a duty of "honest
disclosure" in situations where it is the exclusive agent of two or more
groups with potentially conflicting interest." 
2
Although little attention has been given to the situation where an
individual employee or group of employees claim that the union failed
to properly represent their economic interests at the bargaining table, 3
the general trend indicates that the union enjoys a broad range of dis-
cretion in representing the members of its unit."I4 Nonetheless, a
union, in reconciling the interests of two or more employee groups,
might breach its duty if its motives in reaching a settlement were aimed
at maintaining intra-union power or satisfying the majority of affected
employees. 115
In the context of a players union, the union might well agree to a
draft and sacrifice the freedom of new players to contract in return for
increased pension benefits and job security for veteran athletes.
The issue in this context is whether the union discriminated
against potential draftees who benefited little from what was negoti-
ated. ' 6 Regardless of whether the union's conduct in this type of situa-
tion would be considered arbitrary or in bad faith, an argument could
be made that the union, in failing to give potential draftees an opportu-
nity for input, also failed to maintain a neutral posture with respect to
subjects affecting draftees." 7
D. Availability of Nonstatutory Labor Exemption Upon Expiration of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement
While the above analysis suggests that the labor exemption might
not insulate the amateur player draft from antitrust attack by draftees
or potential draftees, the courts have generally recognized that a collec-
tive bargaining agreement containing player restraints that are the
product of arm's-length negotiations could be shielded from antitrust
11. Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n (Galveston Maritime Ass'n), 148 NLRB 897,
899-900, 57 LRRM 1083 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 1010, 63 LRRM 2559 (5th Cir. 1966).
112. Barton Brands Ltd., 213 NLRB No. 71, 87 LRRM 1231 (1974), reversed in part and
remanded, 91 LRRM 2241 (7th Cir. 1976). Contra, Brauer v. IBEW, Local 45, 86 LLRM
2390 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
113. Wellington 155-63. Cited in Weistart, supra note 8, at 546.
114. See Wellington 145-63. Cited in Weistart, supra note 8, at 546.
115. Morris v. Werner-Continental, Inc. 78 LRRM 2654 (S.D. Ohio, 1971).
116. 7 BLACK L.J. 314, 336-337 (1981).
117. Id at 337.
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attacks by existing players." 8 Where the union has had a significant
impact on the substance of the agreement, the labor policies favoring
the exemption outweigh antitrust concerns. 19 The sports cases that
have considered this issue, however, have involved restraints that were
part of unexpired collective bargaining agreements.' 20 No court has
considered the availability of the labor exemption in a situation where
the collective bargaining agreement containing the restraints has
expired. 121
To allow the exemption to survive an expired collective bargaining
agreement arguably raises the objection that the restraints were no
longer the product of a bona fide bargain. Nonetheless, it might be
argued that to automatically terminate the exemption upon expiration
of the agreement would both create a distortion of bargaining power in
favor of the players' union and impede the bargaining process. These
arguments are discussed below.
1. Does Survival Violate the Bona Fide Bargain Requirement?
The Courts have indicated that the labor exemption will not be
available to shield player restraints from antitrust attack in situations
where there is a lack of bona fide arm's-length bargaining. 122 Thus, the
exemption has been withheld where restraints, unilaterally imposed by
the league before the advent of the players union, were included in a
subsequent collective bargaining agreement but were not the product of
good faith negotiations.1
23
If courts are unwilling to immunize those restraints contained in
collective bargaining agreements that were not bargained for, it seems
unlikely that they would continue to protect restraints that were bar-
gained for after the agreement in which they were contained has ex-
pired, or, in other words, at a point in time in which there is no
collective bargaining agreement in existence.
118. See supra note 69.
119. See cases cited in note 87; see also Weistart, supra note 8, at 586.
120. See, e.g., 600 F.2d at 195; 543 F.2d at 616 n.18.
121. In professional sports significant periods of time have often elapsed between the
expiration of one collective bargaining agreement and the start of a new agreement. In the
NFL, for example, the first agreement between the NFL and the National Football League
Players Association (NFLPA) expired on February 1, 1970, and a new collective agreement
was not signed until June 17, 1971. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d at 610.
The second agreement expired on January 30, 1974, id, and a new one was not executed
until March 1, 1977. Citedfrom 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 170 n.19 (1982).
122. Weistart, supra note 8, at 584, 586; see also cases cited in note 87 supra.
123. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d at 615-16; Smith v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. at 743.
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The requirement of a good faith bargain suggests that at the very
least there must be some quid pro quo. The union, then, is expected to
be strong enough to exact benefits from management roughly equal to
those concessions that it makes. For example, union leaders might feel
that the costs to players associated with a twelve round draft are rough-
ly equal to $x. The union, then, might be willing to agree to a twelve
round draft for three years in return for $3x or the equivalent thereof in
other benefits. Immunizing the draft from antitrust attack in year 4 (or
after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement) gives man-
agement a benefit for which there was no bargained-for exchange. Had
the union anticipated this result, it would have demanded $3x + ($x)(P)
($x being the costs associated with an additional draft and (P) being the
probability that no new collective bargaining agreement would be
reached by the year 4 draft). In fact, the costs associated with the year
4 draft might be greater than ($1x)(P). It is possible in the above hypo-
thetical that at the time the union valued each of the three drafts at ($x)
it contemplated a much greater value for the year 4 draft. For exam-
ple, assume that the union knew that the television contract in effect in
year 1 expired at the end of year 3 and that the league was planning to
expand in year 4. If these two factors were to double team revenues,
the union may well have correlated this increase with an increase in the
costs associated with the draft.
There is authority to suggest that an employer, as long as he first
gives notice and a reasonable opportunity to bargain, is free to abolish
a contractually derived right after the agreement expires. 24 Even if,
however, management were to continue to provide in year 4 the bene-
fits that it bargained away in the prior agreement, the above hypotheti-
cal suggests that it cannot simply be assumed that the year 4 draft was
the product of good faith negotiations. Judicial reluctance to enforce
restraints "thrust upon" players' unions,2 5 suggest that an expired col-
lective bargaining agreement should not protect restraints that violate
the antitrust laws.
2. Does Termination Create a Distortion of Bargaining Power?
The nonstatutory labor exemption exists to foster collective bar-
124. See Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 978-79 (8th Cir. 1971)
(job security and seniority), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1973); Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d
133, 139 (8th Cir. 1970) (trust fund agreement); NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp., 373 F.2d 595,
598-99 (4th Cir. 1967) (superseniority rights).
125. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d at 616.
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gaining. 26 Thus, despite the above analysis, it is important to deter-
mine if there are circumstances in which the collective bargaining
process will be furthered by application of the labor exemption after an
agreement has expired. Both employers and unions have a duty to bar-
gain in good faith over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment. 127 This duty requires that the parties bargain in good
faith before altering a mandatory subject of bargaining and continues
even after the collective bargaining agreement expires. 128 The question
can be posed whether the obligation to bargain before acting unilater-
ally means that mandatory subjects "survive" the expiration of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. Because parties to a collective
bargaining agreement generally contemplate an ongoing contractual
relationship and an employment relationship beyond the expiration of
the agreement, provisions in collective bargaining agreements have not
always been nullified when the agreements have terminated.' 29 The
argument has been made that to withdraw the labor exemption upon
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement produces an unjustifi-
able distortion of bargaining power by enabling unions to enjoin the
enforcement of restraints that were earlier subject to meaningful union
input.
This argument is not convincing. Enabling players to enjoin the
enforcement of unreasonable restraints after the agreement expires
does not create an unjustifiable distortion in bargaining power. Upon
expiration of collective bargaining agreements, the policy reasons for
giving the labor laws preeminence over the antitrust laws are less com-
pelling than while the agreement is still in existence. A shift in bar-
gaining power, to the extent that it occurs, is mandated by deference to
and compliance with the policies of the antitrust laws. Forcing an em-
ployer to comply with the antitrust laws in this context seems appropri-
ate. The fact that the restraint was previously subject to good faith
negotiations should not be controlling. Presumably, the concessions
the union received were equal in value to the costs associated with
126. See supra note 51.
127. NLRA § 8(a)(5),(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5),(d) (1976); see NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736, 742-43 (1962); Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 139 (8th Cir. 1970).
128. See Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1970) (employer's unilateral im-
provement in wages and benefits); see also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1962).
129. 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (1961) (notes omitted): Since parties to a collective
bargaining agreement normally contemplate a subsisting contractual relationship of indefi-
nite duration with regular renewals or renegotiations and since the employment relationship
generally continues beyond expiration of the agreement, rights created by collective bargain-
ing agreements have not always been nullified when the agreements have been terminated.
Citedfrom 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 196 n.142 (1982).
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agreeing to the restraints for the life of the agreement, but not for a
longer period of time.
3. Does Termination Impede the Bargaining Process?
The argument is also made that enjoining the enforcement of re-
straints in this context impedes the bargaining process.13 Presumably,
a union will be reluctant to bargain seriously toward a new agreement
if it knows that when an agreement expires it can seek to enjoin en-
forcement of previously agreed upon restraints.'
3'
It is not clear that preserving the exemption after the agreement's
expiration furthers the policies of the federal labor laws fostering the
collective bargaining process. If the exemption is preserved, manage-
ment, instead of labor, would likely be reluctant to bargain seriously.
In addition, withdrawing the exemption and enabling players to chal-
lenge the restraints seems consistent with the antitrust laws.
The above discussion suggests that there may be some situations in
which the labor exemption will not be available to immunize the NFL
player draft from antitrust attack. As a result, courts may in the future
be forced to consider again whether the justifications for the draft out-
weigh its anticompetitive effects. The evidence presented in the Smith
case failed to adequately address this issue. The information necessary
to properly evaluate the effects of the draft on team strengths is
presented in the statistical study referred to below.
V. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NFL DRAFT SYSTEM
A. Introduction
The following study attempts to measure the extent to which the
draft has historically balanced team strengths. More specifically, an
attempt was made to determine whether a team's priority position in
the draft in one year was related in any significant way to its actual
changes in winning percentage in that year. Because the draft can af-
fect team performances both in the current and future years, the rela-
tionship between a team's draft position in one year and its winning
percentage in subsequent years was also considered.
Team selection positions in the draft, numbered one through
twenty-eight, were used .to measure the relative advantage given to
teams under the current draft system. In theory, a team's relative ad-
vantage in the draft increases as its draft position approaches the
130. 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 164, 197 (1982).
131. Id
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number one. Likewise, a team's relative advantage decreases as its po-
sition in the draft approaches the number twenty-eight.
If the draft accomplishes what the owners say that it accomplishes,
it should gradually strengthen the weaker teams (or those drafting in
the lower positions) and gradually weaken the stronger teams (or those
drafting in the higher positions). Theoretically, the middle teams (for
example those drafting in positions 13 through 16) should experience
little change in relative strength as a result of the draft.
B. Methodology
The purpose of this analysis is to estimate the relationship between
the position in which a team drafts each year and the change in that
team's relative competitive strength in future years. In order to deter-
mine this relationship, variables that reflect both a team's advantage (or
disadvantage) because of its position in the draft and a team's change
in relative strength over time must be isolated.
Since teams draft in reverse order of their previous year's relative
performance, a team's draft position (1 through 28) was used to meas-
ure its advantage of selecting players in any given year.1 32 A team's
advantage in the draft increases as its draft position approaches the
number 1. The change in winning percentage was selected to reflect
how a team improves or decreases its competitive position relative to
all other NFL teams.
The position in which a team drafts in a given year reflects more
than just a priority selection position. The draft position also approxi-
mates the team's quality from the previous year, relative to the other
NFL teams. This base year quality restricts the extent to which a team
can change its relative draft position in either direction in future years.
For example, the team with the first selection can only change its draft
position in an upward direction (i.e. the worst team can only improve
its relative position). Likewise, the team drafting in the fifth position
132. A team's priority position or the advantage it receives in the draft is the variable that
most accurately isolates the impact of the current draft system on team performances. While
it is true that some teams actually trade away their draft selection in certain rounds, the
value received in exchange for that selection should reflect the value of that team's priority
position. For example, the value that the team selecting first receives in exchange for its first
round pick should theoretically be greater than the value received by the Super Bowl winner
for its first selection. Admittedly, one team may receive more in a trade than it gives up.
But this result is not a function of the draft. The importance of the draft is in the advantage
that it gives to a team, not in what a team does with that advantage. One of the major
arguments presented in this paper is that that draft advantage can be neutralized by other
factors such as inferior managerial expertise.
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can change four places in a downward direction and 23 places in an
upward direction.
This restriction was filtered out in order to isolate the advan-
tage/disadvantage gained by a specific position in the draft. Thus,
each model includes a base year winning percentage to reflect a base
year quality. An analysis of variance was conducted on different mod-
els to measure how much variation in a team's change in relative
strength can be attributed to past draft positions with that team's win-
ning percentage from a base year already in the model. The following
function summarizes the models analyzed:
4
WPij = f(WPo, k L I D_ )
where WPij is the change in winning percentage from year i to j, WPo is
the base year winning percentage, and Dj-k is the draft position in year
j-k. 33 The functions that were analyzed and definitions of the corre-
sponding variables are provided in Appendix A.
Data were collected for the period between 1970-1981 and an
analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between draft po-
sition and a change in comparative team strength. 34 The dependent
variables represent a change in a team's relative strength and can be
classified into two groups. The first group of dependent variables sim-
ply measure the cumulative impact of successive drafts on a single
year's change in winning percentage. However, a team might not real-
ize immediate benefits from a particular draft.'35 Therefore, a second
group of dependent variables was included to measure the cumulative
impact of successive drafts on a longer run change in relative compara-
tive strength.
These two groups represent ways of viewing a team's change in
comparative strength over different time frames. The different time
frames represent different perspectives of change. For example, the
133. Chronologically, the draft position in any given year precedes that year's winning
percentage. However, since draft position is determined by the prior year's winning percent-
age, the subscript of each year's draft position was matched with the subscript of the previ-
ous year's winning percentage.
134. Two ways to measure a change in comparative team strength were considered: A
change in draft position and a change in winning percentage. Neither measure completely
explains how a team changes its comparative strength. For example, a team could conceiva-
bly have a change in winning percentage without changing its position in the draft and vice
versa. The change in winning percentage was selected because the addition of Tampa Bay
and Seattle in 1976 automatically resulted in two additional draft positions. Thus, the
change in winning percentage is a more consistent measure over the 12 year period.
135. Many draftees serve a one or two year apprenticeship as a substitute player, depend-
ing on their position. For example: Quarterbacks and offensive linemen often do not
become first string players in their rookie seasons.
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base year quality of a team might not differ from its quality four years
in the future even though that team changed drastically on a year to
year basis during that four year period. That team's change in compar-
ative strength from year to year would be large while its longer run
change would be negligible. Likewise, a team could improve its rela-
tive strength slightly from year to year. That team's longer run change
could be substantially greater than any of the individual year to year
changes.
All models include a dependent variable that measures a change in
winning percentage. Equations 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 include only a base
year winning percentage as the independent variable. Equations 2, 4,
6, 8, 10, and 12 include a base year winning percentage and one, two, or
three prior years' draft positions as independent variables. The differ-
ence between the coefficient of determination of equations 1 and 2, 2
and 3, . . . and 11 and 12 isolates the effects of one or more of the
previous three drafts. This difference was calculated to filter out the
effects of a team's base year quality.
C. Results of Statistical Analysis
The first group of dependent variables (WP12, WP23, and WP34)
all measure a one year change in a team's relative strength. Each varia-
ble is included in a model that contains an increasing number of previ-
ous years' draft positions to reflect the cumulative effect of several
drafts plus the winning percentage from a base year to reflect an initial
quality. For example, the model containing the change in a team's per-
formance from year 3 to year 4 includes the team's draft position in
years 3, 2, 1, 0, and the winning percentage in year 0.136
The analysis of variance conducted on models 5 and 6 indicates
that approximately 22% of the change in winning percentage between
years 3 and 4 can be explained by a team's (priority) selection position
in the three preceding drafts (years 3, 2, and 1). The inclusions of a
base year winning percentage and the year 0 draft position result in a
1% increase in explanation. Thus, only 23% of the change in winning
percentage between years 3 and 4 can be explained by equation 6. Be-
tween years 2 and 3, approximately 19.4% of the change in winning
percentage can be explained by the variables representing a team's ad-
vantage/disadvantage in the two preceding drafts. Finally, between
136. A team's winning percentage in a base year 0 largely determines its draft position in
year 0. As a result, the team's draft position in 0 and its base year 0 quality are inseparable.
However, a team's draft positions in year 1, 2 and 3 can be separated from its base year
quality.
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years 1 and 2, approximately 18.5% of the change in winning percent-
age can be explained by the preceding draft.
The longer run change in relative strength is measured by the re-
maining dependent variables: WP02, WP03, and WPO4. These vari-
ables represent a change in winning percentage from year 0 to year 2, 0
to 3, and 0 to 4. Approximately 14.5% of the change in a team's win-
ning percentage between a base year 0 and year 4 can be explained by
the variable that represents the draft positions in year 1, 2, and 3. Be-
tween base year 0 and year 3, 13% of the change in winning percentage
can be explained by the variable that represents the draft positions in
years 1 and 2. Finally, between base year 0 and year 2, 11% of the
change in winning percentage can be explained by the variable that
represents the draft position in year 1. The results of the analysis con-
ducted on all of the equations are summarized in Table 1 and Table
2.137
TABLE 1
Dependent variables measure a 1 year change in winning percentage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of
First Year of Last Year of Previous Explained Variation
Model Measurement Measurement Draft Years Variation Explained
Number i j in Model r2  by Draft(s)*
(1) 1 2 0 .0383
(2) 1 2 1 .2229 .1846
(3) 2 3 0 .0450
(4) 2 3 2 .2392 .1942
(5) 3 4 0 .0090
(6) 3 4 3 .2269 .2179
*The r2 for the odd numbered models (those models that contain 0 previous
drafts) is the amount of variation in team strengths explained by a team's base
year quality. The even numbered models include both this base year quality
plus one or more draft years. The difference between the r 2 in the even and
odd model in each pair of models is shown in column (6) and represents the
actual amount of variation explained by one or more years' drafts.
137. This discussion is not intended to suggest that the draft will never have a greater
impact on team performances. Admittedly, there might become isolated situations in which
an unusually great player will have a significant impact on a team's performance. The
results indicate, however, that these situations are exceptions.
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TABLE 2
Dependent variables measure more than a 1 year change in winning
percentage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of
First Year of Last Year of Previous Explained Variation
Model Measurement Measurement Draft Years Variation Explained
Number i j in Model r2  by Draft(s)*
(7) 0 2 0 .3442
(8) 0 2 1 .4537 .1095
...............................................................................................
(9) 0 3 0 .4250
(10) 0 3 2 .5544 .1294
...............................................................................................
(11) 0 4 0 .4609
(12) 0 4 3 .6061 .1452
*The r2 for the odd numbered models (those models that contain 0 previous
drafts) is the amount of variation in team strengths explained by a team's base
year quality. The even numbered models include both this base year quality
plus one or more draft years. The difference between the r2 in the even and
odd model in each pair of models is shown in column (6) and represents the
actual amount of variation explained by one or more years' drafts.
Those variables that represent draft position have an impact on
the change in team strengths that is significantly different from zero.
However, the analysis indicates that much of the change in a team's
comparative strength (both from year to year and over a longer time
frame) cannot be accounted for by that team's draft position in prior
years. For example, the model that contained four previous drafts and
measured a one year change in a team's comparative strength (Model
6) reflected the greatest impact on the change in team strength. That
model explained 23% of the change. Thus, seventy-seven percent of the
change cannot be accounted for by those four previous draft positions.
In addition, there are two reasons why it is possible that the above
results overstate the amount of variation in team strengths explained by
the draft. First, the current scheduling format in the NFL is ostensibly
designed to help achieve competitive balance. Under this system, both
a team's draft position and its schedule are functions of its prior season
strength. For example, the worst team in the League not only receives
the first selection in the draft but also a weaker nondivisional schedule
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than the other teams in its division.1 38 This raises the possibility that a
team's change in performance could be partly due to its schedule.
39
Second, the variation in team strength that is explained by the draft
position variables in all models includes more than just the priority
advantage gained by a particular draft position and a base year quality.
Regardless of a team's priority position in the draft and its initial quali-
ty, all teams secure rights to new players each year. The twenty-eighth
player selected in the draft will likely have less of an impact on the
Super Bowl winner than the twenty-ninth player selected will have on
the weakest team, even though those two players should be of compa-
rable quality. Thus, even a random selection process over time will
theoretically have more of an impact on weaker teams than on stronger
teams. This suggests that the amount of explained variation in the
above analysis could be overstated.
D. Possible Explanations for Statistical Results
There are several factors that might account for much of the unex-
plained variation in changes in team strengths. For example, schedul-
ing, injuries, organizational changes, and managerial expertise all
could affect a change in team performance.
There are also several factors that might account for the relatively
small amount of explained variation. First, the argument that the re-
verse order of the draft promotes some degree of team equality rests on
a very large and disputable assumption: that the players chosen by
weaker teams are significantly better athletes than those chosen by
stronger teams. Because college performance indicators are imperfect
predictors of future potential, expert scouting and evaluation systems
are at least as important to teams as their relative position in the
draft."4 The fact that many players are released, only to later succeed
with other teams indicates that managerial skills are different for differ-
ent teams.
Second, the team that receives the first selection in the draft will
have picks 1, 29, 57, 85, 113, 141, 169, 197, . . . etc. while the Super
Bowl winner will have picks 28, 56, 84, 112, 140, 168, 196. The only
significant difference between the draft for the weakest team and the
Super Bowl winner is a single player, the first player selected.' 4 ' All
138. National Football League 1981 Media Information Book, pp. 8-9.
139. The relationship between the strength of a team's schedule and its change in per-
formance will be analyzed in a later article.
140. Demmert, supra note 12, at 37.
141. Demmert, supra note 12, at 36-7; Hearings on § 2372 before the Subcommittee on
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other picks are of comparable quality. The last place team then im-
proves itself by one player compared to the Super Bowl winner. Even
assuming that the teams all possess equal managerial capabilities, it
seems unlikely that this one player alone can significantly close the gap
between the weaker and stronger teams. It is even more unlikely that
the draft will enable mediocre teams to improve their comparable
strength. Their position in the draft will give them an even smaller
advantage over the better teams. 142
Finally, the overall quality of the draft changes from year to year.
In addition, the difference in quality between the first and second play-
ers drafted (or any players selected in sequence) in any given year
might be larger or smaller than the difference in quality between the
second and third players drafted (or any other sequential picks). As a
result, the advantage that a team gains from its draft position, and thus
the impact of that draft position on team performance, will vary from
year to year and within any given year. In some years, this advantage
might be very small.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some type of process by which teams obtain new players each year
is necessary to maintain the quality of play in the NFL. Likewise, com-
petitive balance is a legitimate concern for the League. The present
draft system does appear to have some impact on the change in com-
parative team strengths. However, this system also prevents a player
from receiving a salary which approximates his fair market value. The
impact of the current NFL draft system on the equalization of team
strengths does not appear substantial enough to justify this suppression
of player salaries.
APPENDIX A
Variables
WPi = change in winning percentage between year i and j.
WPo = winning percentage in base year 0.
Dj _k = draft position year j - k.
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92nd Congressional 2nd
Session 1296 (1971-1972). Cited in Sobel, Professional Sports and the Law, 253-254 (1977).
142. Demmert, supra note 12, at 37.
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(1) WP1 2  = f(WPo, DO)
(2) WP12  = f(WPo, Do, DI)
(3) WP23  = f(WPo, Do)
(4) WP23  = f(WPo, Do, Dl, D 2)
(5) WP34  = f(WPo, Do)
(6) WP34  = f(WPo, Do, DI, D 2, D 3)
--------------------------------------------------------
(7) WP02  = f(WPo, DO)
(8) WPo2  = f(WPo, Do, DI)
(9) WP0 3  = f(WPo, DO)
(10) WP03  = f(WPO, Do, DI, D 2)
(11) WPo4  = f(WPo0 , Do)
(12) WPo4 = f(WPo, Do, DI, D 2, D 3)
